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The southern Thailand provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla have seen a 
resurgence in Malay-Muslim violence since 2004. The scale and level of sophistication of 
the insurgent attacks have caused instability in the region and disruption in a country 
already marred by political turmoil. This thesis examines the history, trends in violence 
and actors behind the Malay-Muslim insurgency as well as the effectiveness of the Royal 
Thai Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency response. This is to create an analytical context 
that may be useful in the current Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) approach in 
southern Thailand.  
This thesis also explores the applicability of network centric technologies such as 
hastily formed networks (HFN) as the backbone of a technological framework that will 
deliver information superiority to enable the Thai government to gain a tactical edge 
against the insurgent movement in southern Thailand. Along with the HFN concept, an 
overview of the emerging technologies that were demonstrated during the U.S.-Thailand 
Crimson Viper technology demonstration in Hat Yao, Thailand from August 1–9, 2013, 
are provided. This discussion will show how alternative power sources, social network 
analysis, persistent surveillance systems and unmanned vehicles, if integrated with HFN 
wireless ad hoc networking, provides an effective model to support the RTARF’s 
counterinsurgency operations in southern Thailand. 
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Since 2004, the Malay-Muslim insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces 
of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and Songkhla has escalated. The scale and level of 
sophistication of these insurgent attacks have captured both national and international 
attention, causing obvious disruption within the country and instability in the region. 
According to the 2011 report Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in 
Violence and Counterinsurgency Operations, published by the Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, the current conflict has claimed more than 4,500 lives and another 
9,000 people were wounded. A monthly average of 32 deaths and 58 wounded make the 
ongoing insurgency in southern Thailand the deadliest in Southeast Asia. Most of the 
casualties are a result of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, which average about 
12 per month (Abuza, 2011). 
The Thai central government has been unsuccessful in dealing with the 
insurgency even as new policies are implemented and additional organizations are 
created to confront this problem. In particular, the government has been hampered by 
unreliable intelligence and insufficient information to pursue and prosecute the insurgent 
leaders. The lack of intelligence also has undermined any chance for timely warnings 
about attacks.  
RTARF intelligence operations rely almost exclusively on human intelligence 
(HUMINT) that is sourced from informants, village surveys, interrogations as well as 
interviews. This intelligence gathering approach is mostly unreliable and does not 
provide the critical information to make an immediate and effective operational impact. 
These issues are critical in resolving the problem and preventing the loss of innocent 
human lives. 
For an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) framework in southern Thailand to 
work, emerging technology should be at the forefront of operations with a particular 
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emphasis on network centric operations that enable expeditious and effective collection 
of data for superior decision-making to defeat the adversary.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The problem is the absence of a robust technology framework that provides the 
collection and dissemination of accurate and real-time information, common operational 
picture (COP) capabilities and decision-support tools that effectively address Thailand’s 
southern insurgency problem. The Royal Thai Armed Forces’ sole use of human 
intelligence (HUMINT) through informants does not provide the speed, precision and 
operational intelligence necessary to make critical decisions that result in an effective 
counterinsurgency campaign.  
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to explore the application of network centric 
operations through the integration of hastily formed networks (HFN) and emerging 
technologies, which will be the foundation of a counterinsurgency model to assist the 
Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) in resolving the insurgency problem in Thailand’s 
southern regions. This technological framework will provide mission planners and 
military leaders with enhanced intelligence capabilities for data collection, access, 
analysis, decision support and collaboration as well as long-term information 
management (IM) to maintain information and decision superiority against the enemy. 
D. PLAN FOR THE THESIS  
This thesis aims to provide background about the current insurgent movement in 
southern Thailand, its history, and the political factors behind the Malay-Muslim 
rebellion. It explores the trends as well as the actors of the recent violence.  
Discussion of the evolving nature of the insurgency and trends from 2004 to the 
present is also critical in understanding the dynamics of the problem, as it establishes an 
understanding of evolving insurgent tactics and violence. Having an awareness of the level 
of operational sophistication that the current insurgents have in their operations is a critical 
element in formulating a technological framework that undermines insurgent capabilities.  
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Thailand’s southern separatist problem has resurfaced after a two-decade hiatus. 
For several decades, since the Cold War insurgency operations through recent struggles 
with drug and human trafficking, concerns about Thailand’s porous border has been one 
of the Royal Thai government’s top national security objectives. Understanding the 
“openness” of its borders, the RTARF has asked NPS to assist them in designing a 
concept of operations that incorporates the use of meshed networks, unmanned 
surveillance systems, and analytic tools to provide RTARF military leaders with superior 
information and decision support.  
An analysis of the current RTARF counterinsurgency response, with regard to its 
operational effectiveness, and an assessment of the current security situation within the 
southern border provinces are provided. This research concludes by providing 
recommendations that the RTARF can use as a framework for integrating technology into 
their military operations. 
We feel strongly that the current revolution in military affairs (RMA) is based on 
information. The need for information has created systems and concepts of warfare based 
on obtaining and distributing accurate information—fast. While information distribution is 
essential, another critical element is information analysis that leads to decision-making 
conducive to the disruption of enemy operations. The research paper seeks a technological 
solution that will provide the RTARF an edge in counterinsurgency warfare today.  
The RTARF also has an emerging technology research and development program 
with specific emphasis on unmanned systems, and prototypes were demonstrated during 
the U.S.-Thailand Crimson Viper exercise in August 1–9, 2013. This paper will explore 
how these RTARF systems can be effectively integrated and operated through the ad hoc 
wireless mesh network and effectively conduct surveillance and feed information into a 
common operational picture tool. 
Removing ambiguity— Carl von Clausewitz’s explanation of the “fog and friction 
of war”—is the next great military challenge. Removing the ambiguity of who, what, 
where and when is the focus of this quest for information technology. Network centric 
operations are the new path to warfare. It is a force multiplier being heralded as the best, 
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non-nuclear, way to defeat an adversary. The concept has been embraced by the United 
States military in various ways in an effort to achieve the best solution for their 
operations; we see the same framework for the Royal Thai Armed Forces: the use of 
superior knowledge to exploit enemy weakness and concentrate military resources. 
Improvements in the RTARF’s ability to decisively influence events in its southern 
border region will be the key to ending the Malay-Muslim insurgency problem that has 
caused disruption and instability in the country.  
E. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND QUESTIONS 
1. Research Hypotheses 
 Hastily formed networks can provide the Royal Thai Armed Forces with a 
high level of situational awareness and execution across the battle space. 
 The cumulative impact of superior information and decision making 
provides the RTARF with the capability to destroy the southern 
insurgency movement 
2. Research Questions 
 How effective is HFN technology in assisting the RTARF in its 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in southern Thailand? 
 How does physical terrain and rural isolation in southern Thailand impact 
the effective employment and operation of an HFN wireless mesh? 
 How does NPS’ Lighthouse application assist the RTARF in counter-
improvised explosive device (C-IED) and village stability operations 
(VSO)? 
 What are the limiting factors in the range of the HFN mesh network? 
What methods can be employed and features implemented to extend the 
range? 
 How does the RTARF resolve the logistical issues of supplying power to 
its equipment? How can operations be sustained without relying on fossil-
fuel generators? 
 How can HFN, Lighthouse and UAVs be integrated into a common 
operational picture? 
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, this thesis will provide an 
analysis of the Malay-Muslim insurgency problem in southern Thailand. A review of 
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previous academic research, industry white papers, technical journals, after action reports 
and vendor manuals will be conducted. Lessons learned during Crimson Viper 2013 in 
Hat Yao, Thailand, which allowed us the opportunity for field-testing and evaluation of 
proposed technologies, will be incorporated in this research. Crimson Viper 2013 was a 
technology demonstration sponsored by the MarForPac Experimentation Center (MEC) 
in collaboration with the RTARF, NPS Hastily Formed Networks Center and NPS 
Common Operational Research (CORE) Lab.  
G. CHAPTER BY CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II: Analysis of the Current Security Situation: This chapter discusses 
the history of Thailand’s southernmost provinces, the actors, trends in violence, the Thai 
government’s response, and an analysis of the RTARF’s military response. 
Chapter III: Network Centric Warfare. This chapter covers concepts related to 
network centric warfare as an emerging theory of war and how it enables information 
superiority.  
Chapter IV: Hastily Formed Networks. This chapter focuses on the concepts of 
hastily formed networks, ad hoc networking and the components that form an HFN 
wireless mesh during the Crimson Viper technology demonstration conducted in Hat 
Yao, Thailand, from August 1–9, 2013. This chapter also includes a discussion on the use 
of renewable energy to power HFN equipment as well as an overview of the Lighthouse 
application developed at the NPS’ CORE Lab. It provides a background of the analytical 
methods used in developing Lighthouse as an effective analysis and common operational 
picture tool for commanders in understanding the battlespace as well as its application to 
military operations. 
Chapter V: Conclusion: This section summarizes the work accomplished in this 
thesis and offers proposals for future research. 
 
 6 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 7 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN 
SOUTHERN THAILAND 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
There are approximately 2.8 million Thai-Muslims based on the official census 
conducted in 2000. The vast majority of the Thai population is Buddhist, while Thai-
Muslims represent just 4.5% of the population (Maisonti, 2004, p. 6). Around eighty 
percent of Thailand’s Muslim population lives in the southernmost provinces of 
Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Yala. There is a distinct difference between the 
mainstream Thai population and the population of these southernmost provinces, and the 
differences are based primarily on ethnic background, religious practices and language 
(Ampunan, 2007, p. 1). Ethnic Malays, in particular, have a considerable influence on 
Thai-Muslims because of their cultural and geographic affinity with Malaysia, (Maisonti, 
2004, p. 6). In fact, there is a perception common throughout the country that Muslim 
Thais in the South would rather not be Thai and consider themselves as “Pattani Malays” 
(Janchitfah, 2005, p. 101).  
 
 
Figure 1.  Map of Southern Thailand Showing Population Distribution 
(from Mkenology, 2012) 
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Lungasuka was the former name of what was known as the Kingdom of Pattani, 
and its territory included both Pattani province and Kedah province in Malaysia 
(Ampunan, 2007, p. 4). Today, this area is composed of the southernmost provinces of 
Thailand—Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. Around the 15th and 18th centuries, the 
kingdom was also known as Pattani Darussalam and was acknowledged across the Malay 
world not only as a Malay Kingdom but as an Islamic Polity, or Dar Al-Islam. During 
that time, it was a center of commerce and trade for Southeast Asia as well as a major 
learning center for Islam, with most Islamic scholars describing it as the cradle of the 
Islamic religion in Asia (McCargo, 2008, p. 52). As a result, religions such as Hinduism 
and Buddhism saw a decline in followers while Islam expanded in the region, causing a 
shift to Islamic norms and traditions (Ampunan, 2007, p. 4). 
The emergence of the Thai Chakkri dynasty in the 18th century changed the 
dynamics in the region as it sought to extend its influence and control over the Pattani 
kingdom. There was initial resistance from the Pattani people, but ultimately, the Siamese 
occupiers prevailed and expanded their control over the Pattani territories. As part of its 
occupation, the Chakkri dynasty also sought to eradicate the Pattani legal system, which 
conformed to Islamic law, and replace it with the Thai legal system, which was oriented 
toward Bangkok (Chalk, 2008, p. 2). 
The 1930s marked the acceleration of the Thai government’s efforts to assimilate 
the conquered Pattani region by carving out the region into three separate provinces—
Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala, which were overseen by the Interior Ministry. As part of 
the assimilation process, the government embarked on a modernization program, which 
sought to eliminate all Malay dialects, local customs, Islamic traditions and adherence to 
shari’a law. The main purpose of this policy was to force the Malay-Muslims in southern 
Thailand to adopt the same social behavior and language as with the Thai majority 
(Chalk, 2008, p. 2). 
In 1947 a more drastic policy known as “Thaization” was instituted. The 
proponents of this policy were generally authoritarian elements of the Thai military who 
successfully wrestled political power away from the civilian government. Thaization was 
a broad-based policy aimed at destroying the ethnic Malay identity and religious 
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affiliation with Islam. The policy also sought to further resist any autonomy in the 
southern provinces and force the population to adopt a Bangkok-friendly identity (Chalk, 
2008, p. 4). 
B. SOUTHERN RESENTMENT 
As in most secessionist movements, the population’s resentment emanates from a 
number of factors to include high incidence of poverty and lack of attention from the 
central government. This certainly applies to the southern provinces of Thailand, which 
continually suffer from high unemployment rates, and lack of government support 
ranging from basic infrastructure to education. Most of the grievances are based on these 
socio-economic factors that are exacerbated by cultural and religious incompatibility with 
the rest of Thailand (McCargo, 2010, p. 5).  
Another source of resentment is the continued failure of the central Thai 
government to provide the Malay Muslim population with fair representation in matters 
that affect regional and national issues. There is a perceived injustice by the Malay 
population of the central government’s tepid response in accommodating Malay-Muslims 
into the political process (ICG, 2007, p. 10). 
The 1980s through the 1990s saw a reduction in insurgency driven violence, and 
this was in large part due to government efforts to include the Malay Muslims in the 
overall Thai political system. The Thai government promised changes in the southern 
region’s socio-economic programs as well as improved security. However, most of the 
participants were Malay elites who did not necessarily represent the grievances of the 
majority concerning education, language and religious freedom and as such, a continued 
sense of discrimination continued to overshadow the region (McCargo, 2008, p. 7). 
The conflict and levels of violence in southern Thailand saw an upswing during 
the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. According to a 2011 report, 
Conflict and Displacement in Southern Thailand by the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Center, “levels of violence started increasing in 2001 and in 2002, the 
dissolution by prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra of conflict-management bodies such as 
the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) and the joint civilian-
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police-military task force (CPM) weakened the government’s capacity to deal with 
separatist tensions, and 119 insurgency-driven incidents were recorded in 2003” (Kok, 
2011, p. 3).  
The Thaksin administration adopted a strategy of increased military and police 
presence in the southern provinces, which also coincided with an anti-drug campaign that 
resulted in the deaths of almost 2,600 civilians (Chalk, 2008, p. 15). The civilian deaths 
were believed to be extra-judicial killings perpetuated by police forces, which also 
engaged in numerous human rights violations. There were also “blacklists” that targeted 
specific individuals, which roused more resentment and fear among the people (Kok, 
2011). 
In response to the targeted killings and abuses by police forces, a surge in 
insurgent-led violence occurred, culminating in an attack on a Royal Thai Army (RTA) 
base in the province of Narathiwat. The escalation of violence forced thousands of 
Malay-Muslims to leave the conflict areas creating a humanitarian crisis for the central 
Thai government. As a result, the Thaksin administration imposed martial law in 2004 
followed by an emergency decree in 2005 that was in effect until 2011.  
The implementation of martial law in the southern border provinces, created more 
widespread resentment among the Malays because of the human rights abuses that were 
committed by security officials and personnel and the blanket immunity that the 
government afforded them (ICG, 2007, p. 1). Human rights violations were prevalent, 
particularly against insurgent sympathizers and militants (HRW, 2007). Cases of torture 
and forced disappearances were widely reported. Several high-profile incidents such as 
the Tak Bai killing, Furquan and Krue Se Mosque attacks hasten the insurgent 
movement’s resurgence beginning in 2004 (ICG, 2007, p. 5). The perpetrators of these 
attacks were never prosecuted, and the failure of the Thaksin government to hold the 
culprits accountable served only to reinforce the prevailing negative sentiment among the 
Malays of injustice and alienation (ICG, 2008, p. 2). 
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C. TRENDS IN VIOLENCE 
For the first six years of the insurgency, most of the activity focused on low-
intensity operations conducted by small groups of militants that targeted mainly off-duty 
security personnel, Buddhists, informants and community leaders cooperating with local 
authorities. Attacks were mainly assassinations and harassment. However, the start of 
2009 marked the beginning of the insurgency’s employment of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) focused initially on small-scale attacks on RTARF bases (JIR, 2013, p. 
15). The introduction of IEDs into insurgent tactics resulted in a gradual increase in 
casualties.  
According to data compiled by Zachary Abuza in The Ongoing Insurgency in 
Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations and the Impact of 
National Politics, “between December 2008 and June 2011, 949 people were killed and 
more than 1,700 wounded, which represented a monthly average of 32 and 58, 
respectively” (Abuza, 2011). The numbers are illustrated in Table 1, showing a spike in 
the number of people killed and wounded during that period. 
 
Table 1.   2009–2011 Casualties (from Abuza, 2011) 
Based on the same 2011 study, the casualties inflicted on RTARF security forces 
were mainly from insurgent IED attacks. These attacks were carried out mostly in remote 
villages while RTARF forces conduct escort missions to protect teachers and Buddhist 
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monks (Abuza, 2011, p. 6). However, despite the large number of wounded security 
personnel, there were fewer troop fatalities, which represented only 20 percent of the 
total casualty count. 
Local police forces suffered casualties, as well, because of their presence in the 
countryside, mainly augmenting the RTARF security detail. A total of 44 police 
personnel were killed and 214 were wounded from 2009 to 2011 (Abuza, 2011, p. 7). 
Complementing the RTARF and police forces were village defense volunteers 
(VDVs) and rangers. VDVs were particularly vulnerable to insurgent attacks as they were 
normally ill-equipped volunteers from the surrounding villages who were lightly armed. 
On the other hand, the rangers were predominantly migrants from northern Thailand, 
which the RTARF organized into a paramilitary group. However, the rangers were poorly 
trained and were utilized by the RTARF as an augmenting force in the rural areas 
(Abuza, 2011, p. 7) Casualty numbers for both rangers and VDVs include 122 killed and 
185 wounded, mostly from IED attacks while conducting teacher protection duties.  
Civilians made up most of the casualties as represented in figures 2 and 3. The 
total number of civilian deaths for the period of 2009 to 2011 was 594; 902 civilians were 
wounded (Abuza, 2011, p. 7). The high proportion of civilian casualties was due to 
targeted attacks by the insurgents on Buddhist civilians. Buddhist civilians were natural 
targets as they were widely viewed by Malays as symbolic representatives of the central 
Thai government. The insurgents also targeted Muslim civilians who were suspected of 
collaborating with the Thai authorities. IED attacks occurred mostly in public areas 
which resulted in heavy civilian casualties (McCargo, 2008, p. 4).  
From 2009 to 2011, insurgent attacks were less random compared to the earlier 
years of the insurgency and a retaliatory pattern evolved in response to actions by the 
RTARF security forces. Consequently, civilians suffered the most in terms of casualties 
as a result of these insurgent attacks (Abuza, 2011, p. 5). 
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Figure 2.  Number Killed (by Category), 2009–2011 
(from Abuza, 2011) 
 
Figure 3.  Number Wounded (by Category), 2009–2011  
(from Abuza, 2011) 
The years 2011 to 2012 saw a sharp rise in IED attacks and an increased level of 
sophistication and scale of insurgent operations. This included nine large blasts using car 
bombs and IEDs. One large car bomb was directed toward an entire block of apartment 
buildings occupied by police forces, and another attack targeted 12 shop houses, both of 
which wounded a total of 18 people. The IEDs deployed by insurgents have also 
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increased in size and complexity from an average of 5 to 10 kilograms to 15, sometimes 
exceeding 20 kilograms. The use of larger IEDs by the insurgents has become an 
emerging trend, as three out of the 12 IED attacks in 2011 were 15 kilograms or more 
(Abuza, 2011, p. 8). 
According to a 2013 report from Jane’s Intelligence Review, there was also an 
increase in the number of professionally executed ambushes or drive-by attacks involving 
insurgents operating in section strength and often with several vehicles (JIR, 2013, p. 15). 
Most ambushes were better coordinated and involved the use of large IEDs or vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) against RTARF convoys by well-armed 
insurgents. 
Major assaults on RTARF bases were also undertaken by the insurgent fighters, 
often dressed in military fatigues, who appeared to be professionally trained and well-
equipped. Insurgent operations involved semi-regular units operating at platoon and half-
company strength, showing an increased level of organization. These attacks were aimed 
primarily at seizing weapons, occurring mostly in the strategically central zone of 
Narathiwat province (JIR, 2013, p.15). 
Since 2012 insurgents continue to employ IEDs with their operations; however, 
an expansion of insurgent operations into urban areas has evolved. On the weekend of 
February 16–17, 2013, a series of IED and incendiary attacks occurred in Pattani City, 
and large-scale IED attacks hit Narathiwat and Yala provinces (JIR, 2013, p. 16). These 
attacks were considered a response to a failed assault by insurgent forces on an RTARF 
base in Narathiwat province, which resulted in the deaths of 16 insurgent members by 
RTARF security forces. Although this particular attack was a significant setback to 
insurgent operations, particularly in Narathiwat, the attack underscores the evolving 
nature of the insurgency and the increased sophistication and growth of the movement.  
D. INSURGENTS 
The Barisan Revolusi Nasional Coordinate (BRN-C) has been identified by the 
RTARF as the main organizational driver behind the current insurgency in southern 
Thailand (JIR, 2013, p. 14). It is a loose network of separatist militants, broadly shaped 
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by Maoist theories of revolutionary people’s war. Based on a 2013 report by Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, the BRN-C’s Maoist model of popular mobilization had involved the 
setting up of clandestine, village-level political committees, which direct economic, fund-
raising and logistical activities. This model has also organized civilians into functional 
groups for youth, women and Islamic clerics, which gives the BRN-C a base of support 
that allows the movement to fulfill intelligence gathering, military recruitment and covert 
operations (JIR, 2013, p. 14). 
According to a 2011 report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), “the BRN-C 
may have up to 3,000 fighters and around 40,000 supporters” (HRW, 2011, p. 2). The 
BRN-C does not recognize the Thai constitution and political system and from the time 
of its inception, it committed itself to armed struggle. The organization’s goal is to create 
a sovereign state composed of the southern Muslim provinces (Chalk, 2008, p. 5). 
The BRN-C operates in relative secrecy and not much is known about its leaders 
and organizational planning. Although it is believed that the group follows a pyramid-
shaped structure along classic Maoist lines, with the base of that structure consisting of 
an unarmed militia, involving women, elderly citizens and sometimes children. The 
BRN-C uses this element to support its intelligence-gathering and logistical activities, 
particularly in moving weapons from its base of operations to attack sites. Additionally, 
the BRN-C has orchestrated noisy demonstrations against RTARF forces in the southern 
provinces, with participants coming mostly from this support base. Furthermore, youth 
groups were deployed to conduct vandalism and other nefarious activities across the 
southern districts to underscore the BRN-Cs ability to coordinate operations. The process 
also serves as an indoctrination for youth interested in joining the movement. At the 
middle of that pyramid is the bulk of its armed force that are locally organized into small 
patrol groups consisting of six to seven fighters, that can be expanded upwards to form 
company size units (JIR, 2013, p. 15). At the top of the pyramid are commando units, 
command and control elements and its top leadership who possess advanced training and 
specialized skills such as demolition, close-quarter assault and combat medicine. This 
group has been blamed for most of the recent IED attacks and coordinated assaults on 
RTARF bases, including the January 2004 raid on an army camp which sparked the 
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beginning of the current insurgency. Since then, a total of eight assaults have taken place, 
mostly in the strategically central province of Narathiwat. 
E. THAI GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
In September 2006, the Thai government established the Internal Security 
Operations Command (ISOC) based on the 2007 Internal Security Act signed by Prime 
Minister Surayud Julanont, former general in the Thai Special Forces who took over the 
government in a bloodless coup. The ISOC has four units:  
(1) Civil-Police-Military (CPM) 43  
(2) Southern Border Provinces Administrative Charter (SBPAC)  
(3) Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC)  
(4) Police Special Task Force 
CPM 43 is the ISOC’s military wing while the SBPAC serves as the socio-
economic wing. This unit is also tasked with executing the government’s peace and 
reconciliation efforts and management of security forces. The SBPPC on the other hand 
serves as the joint intelligence center that coordinates all intelligence units and activities 
at all levels. Lastly, the Police Special Task Force is the unit responsible for the 
investigation and arrest of suspects (Ampunan, 2007, p. 16) 
The ISOC is the RTARF’s main organizing body that manages the government’s 
security agenda and strategy as well as the implementation of critical projects in southern 
Thailand.  
2. Force Composition 
According to a 2008 research by the National Defense Research Institute, “CPM 
43 deployed 18,000 police officers; 30,000 military troops from all parts of Thailand; and 
18,000 local volunteers from the ministry of the interior, including 4,000 local soldiers 
from the 15th
 
Light Infantry Division, widely dispersed over the southern Thailand 
provinces” (Chalk, 2008, p. 107).  
Deployed RTARF forces numbered at 66,000, or roughly the equivalent of 21 
battalions. These troops were deployed to a mostly rural area that covers approximately 
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70,713 square kilometers. These troops were deployed to provide security, village 
stabilization operations, protection detail for Buddhist monks and teachers and overall 
restoration of law and order. The RTARF force, were also augmented by 7,500 VDV 
paramilitary troops that were recruited locally to provide border security, supplement 
intelligence-gathering activities and act as a light screening forces (Rodthong, 2009, p. 
22). These paramilitary forces have a distinct advantage in that they use the same local 
language and understand local culture.  
The southern deployment of the RTARF force called for a normal rotation of six 
months, and was relieved by fresh units from the north at the conclusion of the 
deployment period. However, deployments were extended for periods greater than six 
months, and troops were continuously redeployed to the same areas after serving their 
initial tours. 
The increased troop presence and regularity of deployments has seen mixed 
results. According to the 2009 report, Southern Crisis and Daily Violence, “while the 
number of violent incidents was statistically reduced, the number of deaths and injuries 
has increased” (Matichon, 2009). This can be attributed to the increasing levels of 
sophistication of the insurgent groups and their employment of increasingly lethal IEDs 
as their weapon of choice (Rodthong, 2009, p. 23). 
3. Intelligence Activities 
According to the 2007 study, The Need for Intelligence Reform in Thailand’s 
Counterinsurgency, there are multiple intelligence elements within the ISOC structure: 
(1) ISOC Intelligence  
(2) Situation Monitoring Division 
(3) 4th
 
Internal Security Operations Region 
(4) 4th
 
ISOR Intelligence Coordinating Center 
(5) CPM43 Joint Intelligence Center 
The RTARF controls the activities of ISOC Intelligence, which acts as the central 
hub for all intelligence analysis. On the other hand, the Situation Monitoring Division 
falls under the guidance of the Internal Security Coordinating Center (ISCC) within the 
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ISOC and is responsible for monitoring developing situations and follow-on action. 
These two intelligence elements have duplicative functions and there is mostly confusion 
between their staffs with regard to delineation of intelligence responsibilities since their 
missions are similar (Ampunan, 2007, p. 31).  
Intelligence operations continue to rely mainly on human intelligence (HUMINT), 
which is mostly unreliable given the BRN-C’s penetration of most villages and the 
popular support it has in the southern provinces. This heavy reliance on HUMINT does 
not provide the RTARF with critical information to make an immediate and effective 
impact in its military operations. 
The same 2007 study also explains the current intelligence structure, which is 
extracted as follows:  
The intelligence element of the 4th
 
Internal Security Operations Region 
(ISOR) is subordinated to only the military to integrate the intelligence 
tasks. For intelligence operations, there is the 4th
 
ISOR Intelligence 
Coordinating Center that is responsible for intelligence operation, but it is 
assigned under operational control of the CPM43 Joint Intelligence 
Center. The CPM43 is the subordinate unit of the 4th
 
ISOR but it controls 
the operation of the 4th Intelligence Coordinating Center. The reason for 
this kind of command structure, assigned at the order of the Office of 
Prime Minister, is to increase the effectiveness of intelligence cooperation 
and operation for CPM43 in rapidly pursuing the situation. However, this 
management structure creates an overlap in the chain of command and 
decreases the unity of the command. (Ampunan, 2007, p. 32) 
Essentially, there is no unity of effort that produces a common operational picture 
(COP) for Thai government policy makers and RTARF commanders as competing 
interests and parallel tasks exist within a convoluted intelligence structure. 
4. Government Peace Efforts 
There was consensus that the heavy-handed policies implemented by the Thaksin 
administration, which relied extensively on the police to carry out counter-insurgency 
operations, violated human rights and worsened the violence in the south (Arugay, 2012, 
p.16).  
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Prime Minister Julanont issued an apology in October 2006 to atone for the 
policies and injustices carried out by the Thaksin administration. It was an attempt by the 
new government to reach out to the insurgents for negotiations and inclusion into the 
political process. An amnesty program was proposed along with the cancellation of rebel 
blacklists that the previous government used to pursue insurgent leaders (Klaimanee, 
2008, p. 79). 
Despite this effort, no formal agreements were made, and majority of Muslim-
Malays viewed the government outreach with suspicion, given Julanont’s background as 
a former military general (Rodthong, 2009, p. 23). 
More recently, the Thai government and separatist representatives signed an 
accord in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on February 28, 2013, which committed both parties 
to begin a formal dialogue process, to be facilitated by Malaysia (JIR, 2013, p. 14). 
However, violence has continued in southern Thailand and a deep-seated mutual distrust 
continues to exist between both parties, which suggest that a peace settlement remains out 
of reach. 
F. SUMMARY 
The issues faced by the RTARF in southern Thailand not only involve security, 
but a complex web of socio-economic, political and administrative issues unique to the 
Malay-Muslim problem. The current conflict lacks the elements of a conventional war 
and yet the RTARF is slow to recognize this fact and continues to approach the problem 
with conventional military strategy. Our research suggests that the current conflict has all 
the elements of irregular warfare, which necessitates a new concept of operations, 
particularly in the areas of intelligence gathering and information sharing. 
The statements below were extracted from a personal interview with Senior 
Colonel Sorakoset Piamyart, and Colonel Jaturong Juntaranont, by Tibordee Ampunan in 
June 21, 2007, which support our suggestion for a fundamental change in the RTARF’s 
concept of operations that favors a technology driven framework that supports 
sophisticated intelligence analysis, data collection and real-time information sharing. 
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The RTARF’s intelligence organizations put emphasis on collection rather 
than analysis, so that most of the intelligence reporting is somewhat 
scattered and accumulated at the analysis section without sufficient 
integration to create an entire picture of what would be useful in 
eliminating the insurgent organizations. 
In the case of the responsible government organization, it must re-adjust 
its structure and administration in order to improve and allow all agencies 
to access information both faster and simultaneously as a network—not a 
hierarchy—and facilitate access among all levels. This does not mean 
transforming the bureaucracy into a network, but it means applying the 
benefit of networks that are embedded in hierarchical organizations to 
increase the speed and efficiency for cooperation and the sharing of 
information. Therefore, the establishment of an information center may 
alleviate this limitation through the use of information technology, which 
would not only store and arrange the information, but determine who can 
access it. Information technology will enhance the capability of the 
network by allowing all agencies to coordinate efforts and exchange and 
disseminate information in real time. (Ampunan, 2007, p. 33) 
Establishment of an information center can be achieved through a framework that 
leverages the use of hastily formed networks (HFN). HFN technology provides a low cost 
approach that helps address this information technology gap. Using commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) components that are detailed in chapter four, HFN technology helps 
provide coordination and unity of effort through a wireless communications infrastructure 
that allows data storage, sharing, and real-time access to critical information that is 
required for the Thai government’s operations in southern Thailand. With an HFN 
wireless communications backbone, the government can also fully harness the power of 
NPS’ Lighthouse technology that allows rapid mobile data collection and sharing using 
tablets and smartphones as well as social network and geospatial analysis, providing 
enhanced common operational picture capability, for a multi-agency structure. 
This new technology framework is critical, especially for the RTARF’s C-IED 
and VSO activities, as it provides them with enhance analytical capabilities that 
overcomes the weaknesses of their current intelligence collection and analysis model. 
Social networking in particular provides a powerful insight into understanding the human 
terrain. With resurging militant groups such as the BRN-C who gain strength through 
popular mobilization and clandestine activities at the village-level, HFN technology as 
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the network layer integrated with Lighthouse technology on the application layer, provide 
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III. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
What we are seeing, in moving from the Industrial Age to the Information 
Age, is what amounts to a new theory of war: power comes from a 
different place, it is used in different ways, it achieves different effects than 
it did before. During the Industrial Age, power came from mass. Now 
power tends to come from information, access, and speed. We have come 
to call that new theory of war network centric warfare. It is not only about 
networks, but also about how wars are fought—how power is developed. 
—Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski, 
director of Office of Force Transformation 
 
A. THE WAY AHEAD 
In order to transition from the RTARF’s dominant and more traditional state of 
troop-based kinetic warfare into a more decentralized multi-agency effort, a new way of 
executing conflict management must be considered. The high-OPTEMPO nature of the 
RTARF’s counter-insurgency efforts requires a hardware footprint that allows for rapid 
deployment of communication infrastructure, coupled with a well-developed doctrine of 
information management as it applies to war. Understanding this doctrine, Network 
Centric Warfare, is key to the development of a force that can use modern 
communications systems to gain a critical advantage. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In recent years, military leaders, particularly in the United States, have looked 
increasingly at using networks to reduce response time and increase the speed of 
decision-making during operations. The ever-evolving nature of warfare and the 
employment of non-conventional, asymmetric tactics by non-state actors now require a 
different approach.  
Countering asymmetrical threats as they relate to a country’s internal security 
requires the ability to perform various roles with high speed, small size, and reliable 
technology. These asymmetrical threats potentially challenge traditional command and 
control (C2) structures. Therefore, emerging technologies, such as UAVs, ground sensing 
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and mobile data collection devices all linked via wireless networks, present increased 
capability for security forces deployed to remote areas of operation and also help to 
facilitate shared situational awareness across the combat spectrum. 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the military’s solution to the problem of how 
to adapt warfare to the Information Age. The availability of information, the speed with 
which it may be accessed, and the ability to rapidly disseminate it have become 
increasingly vital to maintaining a favorable balance of power on the battlefield. The 
nearly continuous flow of information in modern warfare has allowed NCW to become 
an entirely new way of planning and executing missions. NCW generates increased 
combat power for geographically dispersed forces by linking kinetic assets, sensor data, 
and personnel “to achieve shared intelligence, battlespace awareness, increased speed of 
command, high tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a 
degree of self-synchronization in support of mission accomplishment and an end result 
wherein the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Alberts, 2000, p.65). 
For the RTARF, this creates a situation where its forces are able to achieve a high 
degree of operational maneuver and speed of movement without requiring the amassment 
of assets traditionally associated with victory in the past. With increased speed and 
improved synchronization, the impact to operations in everything, from support areas 
through combat zones, is immediate. The violence in southern Thailand, which is one 
form of asymmetrical warfare, along with terrorism, are all recognized as major threats to 
its security and stability.  
In early 2005, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), 
published two documents that indicated the RTAF’s and the Royal Thai government’s 
vision for the future. Their desires are to develop a military that is more capable, leaner, 
and embraces technology. The first document, “RTAF’s Operational Policy for Budget 
Year 2548,” in the area of Operations Policy, CINC/RTAF calls for the RTAF to, “6.4.5 
develop command and control capabilities by digitizing their system for command and 
control so that future requirements and developments can embrace technological 
advances which will move towards a network centric capability.” CINC/RTAF further 
discusses how the RTAF should “work with allied nations on R&D” and how “R&D 
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should match RTAF needs” (Valentine, 2005, p. 51). These documents illustrate that the 
RTARF recognizes the need for a technological framework to support its military 
operations into the future and allies such as the United States can assist in its goal of 
achieving a highly networked force. 
C. INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
Information superiority, according to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 
Joint Publication 1-02, is defined as “that degree of dominance in the information 
domain which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition…providing 
the operational commander the ability to see and hear virtually anything of importance to 
his/her operation” (JP 1-02, 2005).  
Achieving information superiority provides commanders an advantage, allowing 
them to accomplish their mission using superior control of information while 
simultaneously exploiting (or outright denying) the enemy’s ability to do the same. 
Throughout history, information superiority has been regarded among military leaders as 
a cornerstone of military success. The famous Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote 
in The Art of War  
He who has a thorough knowledge of his own conditions as well as the 
conditions of his enemy is sure to win in all battles. He who has a 
thorough knowledge of his conditions but not the conditions of the enemy 
has an even chance of winning and losing a battle. He who has neither a 
thorough knowledge of his own conditions nor the conditions of the 
enemy is sure to lose in every battle. 
Information superiority is the fulcrum upon which military victory is balanced. There is 
no advantage to be gleaned from a lack of knowledge—this much remains true. What has 
changed, however, is that “many capability-enabling technologies in an information-
driven era” have converged in recent decades. The simultaneous and synergistic 
emergence of new threat scenarios has solidified information superiority as an absolute 
necessity to achieving victory (JCS, 2010). Figure 4 is a graphical illustration extracted 
from the book Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information 
Superiority, which highlights how a superior information position, allows a force to 




Figure 4.  Superior Information Position (from Alberts, 2000) 
Information superiority is a force multiplier for a commander. It allows for new 
options where none existed before; it improves the effectiveness of those options already 
available; it even allows a commander to preempt options seemingly available to an 
adversary. The result is rapid victory at a reduced cost. This frees resources to operate at 
a higher tempo and provides more opportunities to diminish the opportunities and 
advances an adversary may be seeking to exploit. 
Carl von Clausewitz has famously articulated about the fog and friction of war. 
As a result of this enduring characteristic of war, centuries of military operations have 
focused on accommodating a lack of information; that is, how to deal with the fog of war. 
Fog pertains to uncertainty: “uncertainty about where everyone is, what their capabilities 
are, and the nature of their intentions.” (Alberts, 2001, p.5) Until recently a commander 
could not even have a timely and accurate picture of his own forces let alone be 
comfortable about where the enemy was and what they were up to. Friction is about the 
glitches that occur in carrying out plans to synchronize forces or even to accomplish the 
simplest tasks. Some of this friction can be attributed to fog, poor communications, and 
lack of shared knowledge. 
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Decision-making in war carries with it an extremely high cost of error. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that military concepts of operation, organizations, doctrine, and 
training have always been preoccupied with reducing the effects and risks associated with 
fog and friction. However, advances in technology and network centric operations offer 
the opportunity to reduce fog and friction through better communications, 
synchronization of movement and knowledge sharing. 
Table 2, which highlights the objective of information superiority, is extracted 
from the 2001 book, Understanding Information Age Warfare by David Alberts, director 
of the DoD’s Research & Strategic Planning Office and one of the foremost experts on 
information superiority. The table illustrates the relationship between the amount of fog 
and friction and effectiveness.  
 
Figure 5.  Objective of Information Superiority (from Alberts, 2001) 
According to Alberts, the level of communication and synchronization directly 
correlates to effectiveness in military operations. The goal is to operate in various parts of 
the shaded area, and to avoid the lower right (red) area, which is fog and friction (Alberts, 
2001, p. 5). Network centric operations enable military forces to consistently operate in 
the shaded areas by providing capabilities to better communicate, synchronize and share 
critical knowledge in the battlespace, and ultimately improve military effectiveness. 
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D. DOMAINS OF CONFLICT 
Understanding the effect of information on a force’s operational capabilities 
requires familiarity with four domains—the physical domain, the information domain, the 
human domain and the cognitive domain. Figure 5, illustrates graphically how these 
domains are integrated with each other.  
 
Figure 6.  Network Centric Warfare and the Domains of Conflict 
(from U.S. DoD, Office of Force Transformation, 2002) 
This concept was extracted from the 2005 DoD Manual on Implementation of 
Network Centric Warfare and is presented in original form in Table 3 to preserve the 
integrity of the concepts discussed.  
Table 2.   DoD’s Network Centric Warfare Domains (from DoD, 
2005) 
1. Physical Domain 
The physical domain is the traditional domain of warfare where a 
force is moved through time and space. It spans the land, sea, air, 
and space environments where military forces execute the range of 
military operations and where the physical platforms and 
communications networks that connect them reside. 
Comparatively, the elements of this domain are the easiest to 
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measure and, consequently, combat power has traditionally been 
measured in the physical domain. 
2. Information Domain 
The information domain is the domain where information is 
created, manipulated, and shared. It is the domain that facilitates 
the communication of information among warfighters. This is the 
domain of sensors and the processes for sharing and accessing 
sensor products as well as “finished” intelligence. It is where C2 of 
military forces is communicated and the commander’s intent is 
conveyed. Consequently, it is increasingly the information domain 
that must be protected and defended to enable a force to generate 
combat power in the face of offensive actions by an adversary. 
3. Cognitive Domain 
The cognitive domain is in the mind of the warfighter. This is the 
realm of effects based operations (EBO). Many, though not all, 
battles, campaigns, and wars are won in this domain. The 
intangibles of leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training 
and experience, and situational awareness are elements of this 
domain. This is the domain where commander’s intent, doctrine, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures reside. This is also where 
decisive battlespace concepts and tactics emerge. 
4. Social Domain 
The social domain describes the necessary elements of any human 
enterprise. It is where humans interact, exchange information, form 
shared awareness and under- standings, and make collaborative 
decisions. This is also the domain of culture, the set of values, 
attitudes, and beliefs held and conveyed by leaders to the society, 
whether military or civil. It overlaps with the information and 
cognitive domains, but is distinct from both. Cognitive activities 
by their nature are individualistic; they occur in the minds of 
individuals. However, shared sense-making—the process of going 
from shared awareness to shared understanding to collaborative 
decision making—is a socio-cognitive activity because the 
individual’s cognitive activities are directly impacted by the social 
nature of the exchange and vice versa. 
E. PRINCIPLES OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
Within the same 2005 DoD manual, Implementation of Network Centric Warfare 
are nine governing principles underlying NCW. They are the core of NCW’s 
continuously evolving “theory of war in the Information Age.” These insights on NCW 
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principles have been extracted from the manual. Additionally, Figure 5 illustrates how 
NCW principles span the domains of conflict discussed in the previous section.  
Table 3.   DoD’s Network Centric Warfare Principles 
(from DoD, 2005) 
(1) Fight First for Information Superiority  
 Generate an information advantage through better timeliness, 
accuracy, and relevance of information. 
 Increase an enemy’s information needs, reduce his ability to 
access information, and raise his uncertainty.  
 Assure our own information access through a well networked 
and interoperable force and protection of our information 
systems, including sensor systems.  
 Decrease our own information needs, especially in volume, by 
increasing our ability to exploit all of our collectors. 
 
(2) Shared Awareness 
 Routinely translate information and knowledge into the 
requisite level of common understanding and situational 
awareness across the spectrum of participants in joint and 
combined operations. 
 Build a collaborative network of networks, populated and 
refreshed with quality intelligence and non-intelligence data, 
both raw and processed, to enable forces to build a shared 
awareness relevant to their needs.  
 Information users must also become information suppliers, 
responsible for posting information without delay. Allow 
access to the data regardless of location.  
 High-quality shared awareness requires secure and assured 
networks and information that can be defended.  
 
(3) Speed of Command and Decision Making 
 Recognize an information advantage and convert it into a 
competitive advantage by creating processes and procedures 
otherwise impossible (within prudent risk). 
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 Through battlefield innovation and adaptation, compress 
decision timelines to turn information advantage into decision 
superiority and decisive effects.  
 Progressively lock out an adversary’s options and ultimately 
achieve option dominance.  
 
(4) Self-Synchronization 
 Increase the opportunity for low-level forces to operate nearly 
autonomously and to re-task themselves through exploitation 
of shared awareness and the commander’s intent.  
 Increase the value of subordinate initiative to produce a 
meaningful increase in operational tempo and responsiveness.  
 Assist in the execution of the “commander’s intent.” Exploit 
the advantages of a highly trained, professional force.  
 Rapidly adapt when important developments occur in the 
battlespace and eliminate the step function character of 
traditional military operations.  
 
(5) Dispersed Forces 
 Move combat power from the linear battlespace to non-
contiguous operations. 
 Emphasize functional control vice physical occupation of the 
battlespace and generate effective combat power at the proper 
time and place.  
 Be non-linear in both time and space, but achieve the requisite 
density of power on demand.  
 Increase close coupling of intelligence, operations, and 
logistics to achieve precise effects and gain temporal advantage 
with dispersed forces. 
 
(6) Demassification 
 Move from an approach based on geographically contiguous 
massing of forces to one based upon achieving effects.  
 Use information to achieve desired effects, limiting the need to 
mass physical forces within a specific geographical location.  
 Increase the tempo and speed of movement throughout the 
battlespace to complicate an opponent’s targeting problem. 
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(7) Deep Sensor Reach 
 Expand uses of deployable, distributed, and networked sensors, 
both distant and proximate, that detect actionable information 
on items of interest at operationally relevant ranges to achieve 
decisive effects. 
 Leverage increasingly persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR).  
 Use sensors as a maneuver element to gain and maintain 
information superiority.  
 Exploit sensors as a deterrent when employed visibly as part of 
an overt display of intent.  
 Enable every weapon platform to be a sensor, from the 
individual soldier to a satellite.  
 
(8) Alter Initial Conditions at Higher Rates of Change 
 Exploit the principles of high-quality shared awareness, 
dynamic self- synchronization, dispersed and de-massed forces, 
deep sensor reach, compressed operations and levels of war, 
and rapid speed of command to enable the joint force to swiftly 
identify, adapt to, and change an opponent’s operating context 
to our advantage.  
 Warfare is highly path-dependent; hence, the imperative to 
control the initial conditions. The close coupling in time of 
critical events has been shown historically to have profound 
impact both psychologically and in locking out potential 
responses. 
 
(9) Compressed Operations and Levels of War 
 Eliminate procedural boundaries between Services and within 
processes so that joint operations are conducted at the lowest 
organizational levels possible to achieve rapid and decisive 
effects. 
 Increase the convergence in speed of deployment, speed of 
employment, and speed of sustainment.  
 Eliminate the compartmentalization of processes (e.g., 
organize, deploy, employ, and sustain) and functional areas 
(e.g., operations, intelligence, and logistics).  
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 Eliminate structural boundaries to merge capabilities at the 
lowest possible organizational levels, e.g., joint operations at 
the company/sub-squadron/task unit level.  
 
Figure 7.  NCW Concept (from DoD, Office of Force Transformation, 2005) 
F. SUMMARY 
Network centric warfare is an emerging theory of war that is becoming an integral 
part of how most militaries are transforming. It takes information superiority and 
translates it into effective responses and actions. As a war fighting concept, it relies upon 
kinetic assets, sensor data, and personnel being thoroughly connected through rapid, 
networked communication channels in order to synchronize effort by sharing knowledge 
and awareness. Significantly increased combat power comes as a result of this 
achievement of improved awareness and the ability to share it, providing the means with 
which to operate at a higher tempo, expedite command execution, and streamline 
warfighter support. The result will be greater lethality and effectiveness, increased 
survivability, and reduced collateral damage and risk. 
Although Network Centric Warfare is the framework for more effective use of 
advanced communications technology to more efficiently combat adversaries, developing 
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the proper communications infrastructure is of equal importance. The RTARF’s 
operating environment and the high tempo nature of their counter-insurgency operations 
will require a networking concept that will be agile enough to meet their demands. 
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IV. HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS 
Hastily formed networks is a networking concept that employs rapidly deployable 
wireless ad hoc networks that is sourced mainly from commercial of the shelf (COTS) 
hardware and open-source software technologies leveraging the 802.11 WiFi and 802.16 
wireless standards. HFNs are designed to be self-contained and portable so they can be 
used to create nodes in remote areas where there is currently no electricity, and no 
network connectivity; they act as an extension of the enterprise network (see Figure 6). 
The main purpose of HFN technology is to facilitate operations in austere 
environments, allow communications and interoperability between units and share 
operational information. Information sharing is a critical element for any mission as it 
provides military planners with a common operational picture that enhances their 
situational awareness and an in-depth understanding of operational needs. Without a 
robust communications infrastructure, command and control of highly mobile forces that 
are geographically dispersed would be difficult (Hwee, 2007, p. 3). Figure 7 represents 
the various pieces to the HFN puzzle, integrated to form a robust capability. 
 
Figure 8.  Hastily Formed Network Components (from Steckler, 2013) 
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The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Hastily Formed Networks sent a 
team of students to participate in the Crimson Viper technology demonstration in Hat 
Yao, Thailand from August 1–9, 2013, to demonstrate HFN technology to the RTARF. 
The main objective was to create a wireless communications network to support 
participating units in and around the Hat Yao operating area using the wireless 
communication technologies that comprise a hastily formed network. Figure 8 provides a 
map of the wireless network footprint established in Hat Yao, Thailand for Crimson 
Viper 2013. 
As demonstrated by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions during the Asian tsunami in 2004, Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, HFN technology has proven to be an 
effective communications and networking platform. This is reported by the university’s 
HFN research group’s after action reports (AAR) found in appendix A of this thesis. 
Crimson Viper 2013 was an opportunity to demonstrate to the RTARF that the 
same concepts applied to HA/DR can also be employed in a tactical military environment 
as part of a network centric approach that enhances command and control, facilitates real-
time access to surveillance information and enables interoperable communications via 
voice/data/video communications in an area such as the insurgency plagued provinces of 
southern Thailand. A robust wireless network that can be sustained in austere field 
environments providing the products mentioned above leads to information superiority 
essential to maintain an advantage against the adversary. 
The meshed WiFi technology described below can be integrated with unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), for example, to create or extend a “WiFi Cloud.” UAVs could be 
used to create an over the horizon (OTH) communications relay or surveillance capability 
in an operations area that is constrained by terrain and widely dispersed forces. WiMAX 
bridge technology is also discussed, which can link two geographically separated areas 
easily up to 50 kilometers from each other, using point-to-point, point-to-multipoint and 
multipoint-to-multipoint wireless configurations.  
Leveraging the HFN wireless infrastructure, the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) was able 
to train and field test the Android-based Lighthouse application with personnel from the 
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NPS Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab. The Lighthouse 
application is a mobile data collection, social network analysis and geospatial display tool 
that supports counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) activities and village 
stabilization operations (VSO). 
The discussion below represents the wireless concepts and technologies that were 
used during the ten day experiment with RTARF counterparts. 
 
Figure 9.  Crimson Viper 2013 Wireless Network Footprint–Hat Yao, Thailand  
A. WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORK CATEGORIES 
A wireless ad hoc network is typically deployed without a requirement for 
preexisting infrastructure (e.g., wired networks, routers, or access points) and is generally 
decentralized. Data routing is done individually by each node, for the other nodes that are 
established, resulting in a dynamic establishment of nodes that forward data according to 
the network’s connectivity. Typically, wireless ad hoc networks serve a temporary 
purpose in support of specific missions that do not require a permanent communications 
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infrastructure. Although they can also be deployed for longer periods than what the 
original mission called for (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 9).  
Several descriptions are used to capture the concept of Ad hoc networking. These 
include: self-organizing, self-healing, self-balancing and self-aware. The main premise 
behind a self-organizing network is the ability to form a larger network as the ad hoc 
network itself comes into contact with another wireless network, or “cloud” (Valentine, 
2005, p. 70). This is extremely useful for military units involved in operations that have a 
constantly changing scheme of maneuver, since the connectivity through the network is 
retained even though one or more participating nodes may fail, move out of range, or 
have their propagation paths temporarily blocked due to terrain or physical barriers. 
1. Wireless Mesh Networks  
A wireless mesh network (WMN) is defined as a communications network 
consisting of nodes that are structured in a mesh topology. In a mesh topology, the nodes 
of the network have point-to-point connection with the remaining nodes of the network. 
Each node transmits data to other nodes. This ensures that the information flows 
seamlessly within the network as the data is able to reach its final destination through 
alternate communications paths (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 7). With a wireless mesh 
network, each network cloud is aware of its surroundings and can collectively decide the 
optimum path to best send data across the network to maximize throughput (Figure 9). If 
a specific path is either lost or weakened, an alternate path is automatically selected – a 
process known as “self-forming.” As more nodes are introduced into the cloud, the 
network strength increases (Valentine, 2005, p. 71). As nodes are added into the network, 
they will self-organize and self-heal. This process allows for the continuous use of the 
network so that information can be shared without any delays or interruptions. 
WMNs can enable IEEE 802.11 and 802.16 standards. Mesh networks, because of 
their ability to self-heal and organize, provide scalability, allowing coverage over wider 
geographic areas. Because of the multiple nodes involved, a WMN is highly reliable and, 
certainly redundant. They also provide a cost-effective means of extending the enterprise 
as connectivity is spread among multiple mobile users that have specific requirements to 
access applications (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 7). 
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Figure 10.  Wireless Mesh Network(from Valentine, 2005) 
2. Mobile Ad Hoc Networks  
A MANET, according to the Advanced Network Technologies Division of 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is defined as “an autonomous 
collection of mobile users that communicate over relatively bandwidth-limited wireless 
links” (NIST, 2012). Due to the mobility of a MANET’s nodes, particularly during 
military maneuvers, the network topology may assume various configurations that were 
not initially planned (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 8). Because MANETS are mobile, they use 
wireless connections to form a self-configuring network that communicate using multi-
hops within nodes. The wireless connections can be standard WiFi, cellular or satellite 
connectivity. The constant mobility of the nodes distinguishes the MANET from a WMN 
in which the nodes are less mobile and sometimes permanent.  
MANETs are also decentralized and do not require existing infrastructure or 
regulated connectivity (2012, Menjivar, p. 40). However, there are various issues that 
adversely impact the communications link such as topology, interference, propagation 
and attenuation (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 8). 
In military operations (Figure 10), MANETs need to have the ability to overcome 
constraints in connectivity, bandwidth, communications security, power and scale. Other 
issues such as reliability, jamming, latency and network failure recovery must be 
considered in planning the MANETs design and performance (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 8). 
Military networks are also designed to operate in ways that assures low probability of 
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intercept and detection. As such, the nodes need to be configured so as to discharge the 
least amount of power and moderated transmission frequency so as to evade the 
adversary’s sensors. A departure from these specifications may result into the degradation 
of the network’s performance and credibility (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 9).  
 
Figure 11.  Mobile Ad Hoc Network (from Kontogiannis, 2012) 
3. Wireless Ad Hoc Sensor Networks  
A wireless ad hoc sensor network (WSN) is one of the most robust types of 
networks for wireless communications particularly for military use. WSN’s consists of a 
number of sensor nodes spread across a defined geographical area (2009, Misra). The 
NIST definition states that “each sensor node has wireless-communication capability and 
some level of intelligence for signal processing and dissemination of data” (NIST, 2012). 
WSNs are distinct from WMNs or MANETs since their primary application is not 
limited to communications, but they have the added advantage of data gathering through 
integrated sensors that can be shared throughout the network (Kontogiannis, 2012, p. 14). 
The following list extracted from the NIST website contains examples of how 
wireless sensor networks are applied: 
 Military sensor networks for surveillance and detection of enemy 
movements or other important phenomena like explosions 
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 Sensor networks for detection of chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) materials or attacks  
 Wireless-sensor surveillance networks for providing security in public 
places or other facilities monitored by authorities or security companies    
 Detection of explosives during an IED attack 
In a study by V. Krishnamurthy, on Emission Management for Low Probability 
Intercept Sensors in Network Centric Warfare, he writes 
The information for generating battlespace awareness in NCW is provided 
by numerous sources, for example, stand-alone intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance platforms, sensors employed on weapons platforms, or 
human assets on the ground. In the fundamental shift to network-centric 
operations, sensor networks emerge as a key enabler of increased combat 
power. The operational value or benefit of sensor networks is derived from 
their enhanced ability to generate more complete, accurate, and timely 
information than can be generated by platforms operating in stand-alone 
mode. (Krishnamurthy, 2003, p. 2) 
Certainly, the unique capabilities that are derived from wireless network sensors 
are indisputable. They have a wide-range of military applications that enhances 
situational awareness that results in superior decision-making. In a dynamic and 
constantly evolving operational environment, the ability to sense the situation around you 
and share that awareness, creates a more effective force that can act in unison and with 
shared understanding of the terrain, weather, demographic conditions and enemy intent. 
B. HFN NETWORK COMPONENTS 
1. 802.16—Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access  
WiMAX is a long-range wireless communications technology that is based on the 
IEEE 802.16 standard. It is generally viewed as the “last-mile” solution that expands 
broadband connectivity to rural areas and cities through a robust wireless link (Hwee, 
2007, p. 55). WiMAX antennas are known for their compactness, flexibility and rapid 
installation. Additionally, these antennas can be mounted on poles and are generally 
weatherproof. WiMAX are usually deployed to provide coverage to areas that can extend 
up to 50km. A mobile user does not need specialized software to gain connectivity as the 
technology itself assures a persistent, high-speed wireless connection. 
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Figure 12.  WiMAX Network Architecture 
a. WiMAX Wireless Configurations 
Given the terrain and remoteness of rural areas in southern Thailand, the ideal 
tactical network should be based on wireless LAN and meshed technologies that do not 
require a physical data transportation infrastructure (Figure 11). This solution is a more 
cost-effective approach compared to conventional communication technology, as it does 
not require running cables for communications reach back. There are three wireless 
configurations that can be employed: Point-to-point, point-to-multipoint, or multipoint-
to-multipoint. It is important to understand the differences between these configurations 
to effectively employ the best tactical network that can cover a wider area of operations 
without the restrictions associated with an area’s physical terrain. 
(1) Point-to-point Configuration 
A point-to-point wireless configuration is simply two stations communicating 
with each other (Figure 12). It is not efficient for multicasting or sharing of information 
with multiple stations. True “networking” does not take place. 
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Figure 13.  Point to Point Network 
(2) Point-to-multipoint Configuration 
Point-to-multipoint wireless networks are generally constrained because of the 
lack of interaction among the clients within the network (Figure 13). Data transmission 
only occurs between sender and receiver, however, not among the nodes in the network 
(Valentine, 2005, p. 69).  
 
Figure 14.  Point to Multi-Point Network 
(3) Multipoint-to-multipoint Configuration 
The multipoint-to-multipoint topology is the preferred wireless configuration for 
military applications. In this configuration, every node becomes a router within the 
network, which enables a much wider coverage and allows for the formation of ad hoc 
networks (Figure 14).  
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Figure 15.  Multi-Point to Multi-Point Network 
The 802.16 standard was designed to provide permanent broadband wireless 
access in a local area network (LAN) or metropolitan area network (MAN) environment 
(Intel, 2005). It operates in the 10 and 66 GHz frequency range and has the same 
performance similar to Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) or T1 systems. Data transfer rates 
for line-of-site (LOS) transmission using the 10-66 GHz frequency range, approaches 120 
Mbps while non-LOS transmissions in the 2-11 GHz frequencies are 70 Mbps (Leeper, 
2005). Overall, 802.16 systems provide a reliable alternative to wired systems as they are 
generally cheaper to maintain (no use of fiber optic or CAT-5 cabling), ease of setup 
(plug and play capability) and broader coverage of specific areas because of the long 
range and scalability.. 
During the Crimson Viper 2013 experiments in Hat Yao, Thailand, two WiMAX 
links were set up approximately two miles apart (Figure 15). The link was established in 
less than thirty minutes and a WiFi mesh was immediately established to support various 
operations. Internet reach back was provided through Broadband Global Area Network 
(BGAN) portable satellite and very small aperture terminal (VSAT) units at two separate 
locations which will be discussed in the next section. 
In a similar NPS field experiment in Thailand known as Coalition Operating Area 
Surveillance & Targeting System (COASTS) that was conducted in Thailand in 2005, 
two 802.16 links, six kilometers apart were set-up and achieve full operational capability 
in under two hours (Valentine, 2005, p. 73). According to the after action report from the 
2005 COASTS experiment, large amounts of video, sensor data and network information 
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was delivered over the network with a high degree of speed and accuracy, due to the 
large bandwidth available. The combined cost of the equipment (provided by Redline 
Communications) required to operate these two links was approximately $30,000 USD. 
This cost compares favorably with the costs of laying fiber-optic cable, which is 
approximately $20,000 USD per mile in Thailand (Valentine, 2005, p. 74). 
 
Figure 16.  WiMAX Antenna Deployed in Hat Yao, Thailand  
2. 802.11 Wave Relay MANET 
Wave Relay is a “Mobile Ad Hoc Networking system (MANET) designed to 
maintain connectivity among devices that are on the move” (2014, Persistent Systems). It 
is a peer-to-peer mesh networking solution, using a proprietary algorithm, designed for 
forces that are deployed in difficult and austere environments, but have a requirement for 
robust communications connectivity that is also secure and dynamic. According to its 
manufacturer, Persistent Systems, it is a scalable system that has a throughput of 41 Mbps 
UDP and 31.1 Mbps TCP. It uses a Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision 
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) which avoids collisions by only transmitting after the channel is 
detected to be in idle mode (Chatzigiannis, Gibson & Singh, 2012).  
For the Crimson Viper 2013 field experimentation in Thailand, there were two 
models used: the Quad Radio Router and the Man Portable Unit Gen4 (MPU4) with the 
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tethered Android kit. Two (2) Wave Relay Quad Radio Routers were set up; one unit at 
the network operations center (NOC) and the other was located at the beach within close 
proximity to the U.S. and Royal Thai Navy (RTN) explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
team's base of operations. Two (2) MPU4’s were deployed separately with two EOD 
units in support of the IEDNA (Improvised Explosive Device Network Analysis) 
experiment using the NPS Lighthouse technology. 
a. Quad Radio Router 
The Wave Relay Quad Radio Routers (Figures 16–18) are MANET wireless 
devices packaged in compact ruggedized cases, which may be used to implement a large 
geographic coverage network. They have a range of more than two miles using an 
omnidirectional antenna, and a 27Mbps maximum throughput on TCP and 37Mbps on 
UDP, using a 20MHz channel (2014, Persistent Systems). Each unit contains four 
separate wireless radios with the ability to perform package routing functions. Each Quad 
Radio operated may be procured in one of several frequencies, to include but not limited, 
to 700 MHz, 900 MHz, 2.3-2.4 (S-Band) GHz, and 5.8 GHz (C-Band) (2014, Persistent 
Systems). The router has a proprietary algorithm that selects the strongest signal path to 
communicate with neighboring nodes.  
 
Figure 17.  Wave Relay Quad Radio Router 
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Figure 18.  Quad Radio Router #1 at the JOC, Hat Yao, Thailand 
 
Figure 19.  Quad Radio Router #2 on the beach in Hat Yao, Thailand.  
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b. Man Portable Unit Gen4 (MPU4) 
The MPU4 is a portable and lightweight 802.11 radio (Figure 18), which operates 
between 700 MHz and 5 GHz frequency range. It provides MANET capability directly to 
units that operate in austere environments and difficult terrain. The MPU4 utilizes a 
standard military battery that according to its manufacturer “provides 14 hours of run-
time and enables customers to reuse batteries and chargers that are already in their 
supply system” (Persistent Systems, 2014). It also supports peer-to-peer network 
topology, real-time position location through a connected GPS and serial data 
transmission to participating network nodes. With the high data bandwidth that it uses, it 
is able to provide up to 37 Mbps of throughput supporting voice (up to sixteen press-to- 
talk (PTT) channels), video, and data communications (Persistent Systems, 2014). The 
MPU4’s effective range with the use of an omnidirectional antenna is approximately two 
nautical miles with a peak transmission power of two watts.  
 
 
Figure 20.  Wave Relay Man Portable Unit Gen4 (MPU4) 
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A wireless mesh that integrates both WiMax and Wave Relay systems (shown in 
Figure 18) provides the best option in both long haul and short-range connectivity. Table 
5 shows a comparison of the technical specifications between these two systems. 
 
Table 4.   WiMax versus Wave Relay (from Morris, 2011) 
3. Broadband Global Area Network  
The Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) was created in 2006 and was 
designed to be transported by a single person and able to connect to a satellite within 
minutes. The network is provided by the British satellite telecommunications company, 
Inmarsat and uses three geostationary satellites to provide global coverage.
  
BGAN allows any mobile device with wireless capabilities to connect to the 
internet because of its dynamic host control protocol (DHCP) capability that 
automatically provides devices with a unique internet protocol (IP) address, allowing 
them to use the BGAN’s WiFi cloud after entering the requisite wireless encryption 
protocol (WEP) key. This key feature allows several mobile users to utilize the BGAN to 
accomplish operational tasks. Figure 20 shows the Inmarsat I-4 satellite coverage area 
along with the corresponding look angles. Theoretically, the Inmarsat footprint covers 
most of the world with the exception of remote polar regions. 
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Figure 21.  Inmarsat BGAN Coverage Map with Look Angles (from Inmarsat, 2014) 
BGAN satellite terminals are ideal for RTARF troops traveling in remote 
southern areas because of its light weight and ease of use. Additionally, they are 
ruggedized and some models such as the Hughes 9201 also come with the ability to 
broadcast a WiFi signal within a 100-meter circumference area, creating a WiFi cloud for 
mobile devices. This capability provides small RTARF teams the ability to operate in 
remote rural areas while maintaining Internet connectivity. Critical command and control 
functions are assured through various communication methods such as email, voice over 
internet protocol (VoIP) applications such as Viber or Skype, simple mail service (SMS) 
text messaging and virtual private network (VPN) services.  
The BGANs used during the Crimson Viper 2013 experiment were the Hughes 
9201 (Figure 21) and 9450 on-the-move satellite terminal (Figure 22). The Hughes 9201 
is a lightweight, portable device which can be carried in a shoulder bag or briefcase.  
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Figure 22.  Hughes 9201 BGAN satellite terminal 
The Hughes 9450 satellite terminal (Figure 22), also known as “BGAN In-
motion” is a mobile unit that can be magnetically mounted on a vehicle’s roof. There is a 
built-in tracking antenna that automatically maintains satellite connectivity while the 
vehicle is in motion. The Hughes 9450 BGAN terminal is ideal for use in RTARF 
command vehicles that have the need for constant movement but require internet reach 
back capability and command and control functions. 
 
 
Figure 23.  Hughes 9450 Mobile Satellite Terminal 
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According to the company Inmarsat, the BGAN satellite terminals have the 
capability of transmitting data at an uplink and downlink speed of up to 492 kbps 
(Inmarsat, 2011). However, this speed can only be reached with the X-stream capability. 
On connections with the satellites, the user must specify the connection speed of 32, 64, 
128, 256 kbps, or X-stream. Once connected and the link has been established, multiple 
users can use the device via the built in WiFi access point.  
While testing the Hughes BGAN in Hat Yao, Thailand during Crimson Viper 
2013, the highest uplink speed obtained was 79 kbps and the fastest download link was 
54 kbps. The signal strength to the satellite was 100% and the speed chosen was 256 
kbps. The weather was clear with no physical interference. 
 
Figure 24.  Hughes 9201 BGAN Terminal Connected to a WiMAX Antenna 
(from Crimson Viper 2013, Hat Yao, Thailand) 
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The BGAN does have some drawbacks and limitations. First, it is required to run 
on Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards. The SIM cards are only good for a designated 
amount of download bandwidth and can be used up quickly creating a need to carry 
multiple SIM cards each time the BGAN is used. Second, the cost to use the device is much 
greater than the VSAT because it is based on data usage versus flat monthly fees, typically 
around $4 to $7/Mbyte (Inmarsat, 2014). BGANs are also reliant on line of sight (LOS) 
connectivity to the satellite. This drawback may be an issue for RTARF forces that are 
deployed in major population centers that have tall buildings and infrastructures or even 
remote mountainous areas with large trees and multiple obstructions. Maintaining a reliable 
communications link may be challenging due to these conditions (Morris, 2011, p. 46). 
4. Thuraya IP Data Terminals 
The Thuraya IP data terminal (Figures 24-25) is an advanced dual-mode GSM 
cellular/satellite device, designed and built by Hughes for the Thuraya satellite system 
gateway. Thuraya, is a telecommunications company based in the United Arab Emirates, 
which according to its website, has a satellite network that covers more than 120 
countries including the world’s remotest locations, ensures congestion-free satellite 
communications and connectivity at all times through its “always-on” network access 
(2014, Thuraya).  
The product that was tested during the Crimson Viper field experimentation in 
Thailand was the Thuraya IP Plus, an ultra-light weight (weighing 1.4 kilograms) and 
compact satellite modem that according to the company, “is the world’s smallest, 
highly portable and most durable satellite terminal” (Thuraya, 2014). Although not 
specifically measured during the exercise, the datasheet extracted from the Thuraya 
website shows that the terminal is capable of providing data rates of 444 kbps on 
standard IP and 384 kbps using streaming IP. These speeds provide enough throughput 
to support various internet-based applications such as VoIP, email services, video 
conferencing and broadcast and web browsing. The Thuraya IP terminal has a rugged 
design and is compliant with the IP 55 protection standard. This makes it ideal for use 
in rough weather and austere environments – conditions that the RTARF forces 
continuously encounter in the remote areas of southern Thailand. The dual mode 
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functionality also allows RTARF users to switch to the GSM mode to take advantage of 
the area’s existing GSM cellular infrastructure. 
 
Figure 25.  Thuraya IP Data Terminal 
 
Figure 26.  Thuraya IP Data Terminals at the CV13 NOC, Hat Yao, Thailand 
5. Very Small Aperture Terminals  
VSATs were also used during the Crimson Viper field experiment and were 
specifically located at the persistent ground surveillance system (PGSS) area of 
operations. The NPS Hastily Formed Networks Center has successfully deployed VSATs 
with its disaster response teams during the Asian tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 
2005, Haiti’s earthquake in 2010 and most recently, during the aftermath of Typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013. Because of their mobility, high throughput and 
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applicability in remote and austere environments, supporting voice, data and video 
streaming functions, VSATs (shown in Figure 26), can be a robust reach back option for 
the RTARF in southern Thailand.  
 
Figure 27.  Tachyon Network VSAT Terminal   
Although not as portable as the BGAN or Thuraya satellite terminals, VSATs 
offer enough mobility since the size of their dish antennas do not normally exceed three 
meters. The vast majority of VSAT dish antennas range between 75 centimeters to 1.2 
meters. What makes VSAT terminals compelling is the throughput, which range from 4 
kbps to 16Mbps. The satellites used by VSAT terminals are in geosynchronous orbit and 
operate in the X, C, Ka, and Ku bands and can connect to an array of satellites.  
Additionally, the VSAT network can be deployed in one of three configurations:  
(1) Star Topology 
This is a configuration where a network operations center (NOC) is utilized as a 
hub or main uplink site, to transmit data between deployed VSAT terminals through the 
satellite. If a remote VSAT terminal intends to transmit data to another terminal in the 
network, it would have to send the data packets to central NOC. This is known as a 
“double hop” link using the satellite (Figure 27).  
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Figure 28.  VSAT Star Topology 
(2) Mesh Topology 
With this configuration, each VSAT in the network can transmit data packets 
directly to any VSAT terminal within the network. Unlike the star topology, a central 
uplink site like a NOC is not required as all the terminals share network control duties 
(Figure 28).  
 
Figure 29.  VSAT Mesh Topology 
New commercial VSAT systems such as Inmarsat’s GlobalXpress (figure 29) are 
entering the marketplace and leverage Ka band technology. Ka band operates in the 26.5–
40 GHz frequency range and offers higher bandwidth communications.  
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Figure 30.  Inmarsat GlobalXpress (from Inmarsat, 2014) 
VSAT commercial satellite communication systems present a convincing value 
proposition, particularly for developing countries like Thailand who may find launching 
and maintaining their own satellite constellation, cost prohibitive and untenable.  
6. Reusing Existing Natural Energy, Wind and Solar (RENEWS) 
Operating networking equipment and mobile communications effectively requires 
a reliable power source. Remote environments that are typical in the Asia-Pacific region 
are usually outside the reach of a country’s electrical power grid. Most military 
operations are away from urban centers and typically rely on fossil fuel generators to 
power their equipment. In the insurgent infested areas of southern Thailand, supply routes 
are usually vulnerable to attacks. So securing supply lines with personnel and resources 
that are already stretched thin becomes a priority for RTARF planners so they can deliver 
fuel and critical logistics to remote units. Units stationed in remote rural outposts face 
significant challenges in powering their electronic devices. Without fuel to power 
military equipment, the idea of network centric warfare using HFN technology is 
rendered ineffective for counterinsurgency operations. 
During the Crimson Viper 2013 exercise, the U.S. Army contingent demonstrated the 
Reusing Existing Natural Energy, Wind and Solar (RENEWS) system (Figures 30–32). 
RENEWS is a self-sustaining system that completely relies on renewable energy sources 
such as solar and wind. The system was designed to provide reliable power to small teams 
operating in remote areas where fuel re-supply becomes challenging or in some cases, 
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outright dangerous. The power requirements of these units are minimal since they normally 
operate communications equipment that are smaller in size and require less power.  
According to the U.S. Army’s Command, Power & Integration Directorate, 
“RENEWS is designed to produce up to 300 watts, enough to power portable 
communications equipment continuously as long as there is power coming daily from the 
solar panels or wind turbine. The storage component provides power at peak demand for 
about five hours when energy is not being generated by the renewable components. The 
RENEWS components weigh about 100 pounds, and it is stored in two cases weighing 
about 70 pounds each” (U.S. Army, CERDEC, 2014). 
The NPS HFN research team in partnership with U.S. Army personnel, field-
tested the RENEWS components in Hat Yao, Thailand and found the flexible solar panels 
and wind turbine to be effective in powering the HFN wireless mesh.  
The team set up the RENEWS components in each of the following locations: 
(1) Crimson Viper JOC (Figure 30) 
(2) C-IED site (figures 30 and 32) 
The two sites were approximately two miles apart and had the standard HFN fly-
away kit composed of one (1) 802. 16 WiMAX radio/antenna, one (1) Wave Relay 
802.11 quad radio wireless access point, one (1) Wave Relay MPU4, one (1) laptop and 
six (6) BB-2590 rechargeable lithium ion military batteries. Each site was powered 
completely by three 90W flexible solar panels and the wind turbine. Each site was able to 
operate continuously for eight hours without ever tapping into the electrical grid.  
This proves that integrating RENEWS with HFN equipment helps alleviate the 
dependence on using fossil-fuel generators in remote areas. By reducing the amount of 
consumable resources being used, and relying more on natural alternatives such as wind 








Figure 32.  RENEWS with WiMAX and Wave Relay AP at C-IED Site 
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Figure 33.  RENEWS Wind Turbine and Solar Panels at Hat Yao Op Area 
7. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as Aerial Nodes 
Although UAVs are outside the scope of the current HFN technology 
implementation, it is important to consider the concept as it extends the capabilities of 
existing wireless systems, increasing their range and coverage area. HFNs using UAVs as 
aerial nodes (Figure 33) provide the flexibility to extend the HFN wireless mesh beyond 
the horizon and throughout the uneven terrain typical to the RTARF operating areas. 
Over the horizon (OTH) communications are an integral part of network centric 
operations: it overcomes terrain restriction and optimizes the coverage of a network for 
multiple ground units spread over a large area.  
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Figure 34.  UAV Aerial Network Node (from Hubbard, 2002) 
The modern warfighter is equipped with numerous tools that enhance his/her 
situational awareness, such as communications gear, targeting tools, computer displays 
and various technologies that make him/her information-enabled. Utilizing these different 
elements requires a greater network signal footprint, in order to extend the command and 
control that the unit commander can exercise. Furthermore, a UAV acting as a wireless 
aerial node with long loiter times can provide “local persistence.” Local persistence 
allows continuous availability of intelligence data. This allows the on-site commander to 
access information obtained directly through organic units and distribute this information 
through the HFN wireless mesh.  
a. UAVNET 
Traditionally, UAVs have been used by the military for surveillance and 
reconnaissance operations, with military classifications of UAVs falling under three tiers. 
Tier I UAVs are ship or battlefield-launched and designed for quick response missions. 
Tier II UAVs such as Global Hawk and Predator, are designed for endurance operations 
at medium altitude. Tier III UAVs, such as Dark Star, are high-altitude cruising vehicles 
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designed for low observability and greater endurance. All three of these types are over-
kill for the purposes of HFN; they are expensive, require considerable infrastructure to 
support for both operations and maintenance, and are unable to exercise the kind of time-
on-station within very constrained operating space necessary for the proposed mission. 
With the advent of robust wireless networking technologies, particularly those 
based on the 802.11 and 802.16 standards, and taking advantage of commercially 
available smaller and more portable vehicles, UAVs can be equipped with wireless 
transceivers and thus enabled to communicate with ground nodes as well as other UAVs.  
The following scenarios are based on a framework called UAVNet that originated 
from the Institute of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, University of Bern in 
Switzerland. According to the experiment, “UAVNet is a highly adaptive and mobile 
WMN using small UAVs. It includes a concept and a prototype implementation of an 
autonomously and temporarily deployable WMN, using UAVs with attached wireless 
mesh nodes. The deployed communication network enables the connectivity between 
different end systems like notebooks, smartphones and tablets and even other wireless or 
wired networks” (Morgenthaler et al, 2013).  
Two of the three scenarios below have been borrowed from the University of 
Bern research, with the third being our own theoretical scenario.  
(1) Airborne Relay Scenario with a Single UAV 
In this first scenario, only a single UAV is needed to establish a communications 
link, connecting two users at separate locations. The UAV would operate autonomously 
and fly between the two locations, while using the wireless mesh to forward packets of 
data between the two end points. The UAV starts in an area close to the first location and 
broadcasts ping messages on a regular basis. As the first location receives the packets, it 
sends a GPS signal to the UAV, so it can determine its exact location. Once the UAV 
determines the GPS coordinates, it begins to fly toward the first location in a spiral track 
while it simultaneously searches for the second location by broadcasting similar ping 
messages. Once the second location receives the UAV ping, it also sends its own GPS 
signal for the UAV to track. So in theory, the UAV simply flies autonomously between 
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the two end points as long as a persistent communications link between all three assets 
are established. The UAVs flight control systems (FCS), allows the UAV to calculate 
relative distances between the two locations and determine the center position between 
the two, to maximize the effective range between both end points and efficiently act as an 
aerial relay for both locations. 
(2) Airborne Relay Scenario with Multiple UAVs 
In situations that require wider network coverage, a single UAV may not be 
sufficient to bridge the distance between two or more locations; so multiple UAVs may 
be required to create a communications relay. Using the wireless mesh nodes, several 
UAVs can form a chain to transmit data packets between two locations. The scenario, 
theoretically works as follows:  
(1) A single UAV starts the chain and serves as the scout to spot the location of 
the first user, using a similar search algorithm described in the first relay scenario. Once 
the UAV approaches the location, it broadcasts a GPS signal so all the other UAVs in the 
chain so they can proceed to the location of the first user.  
(2) Once the first phased is accomplish, the first UAV will then approach the 
second user’s location based on the GPS signal broadcast from the second user. 
Alternately, the UAV will also relay the GPS coordinates of the second user to the UAV 
chain. The UAV will then take a position that is centered between the two locations.  
(3) Once the first UAV arrives at center point, it flies back to the first location and 
determines the signal strength value and stay in place as its final position.  
(4) The second UAV approaches the location of the first UAV and moves back 
toward the direction of the second location until it receives the signal strength relative to 
the first UAV;  
(5) This process is repeated with the rest of the UAV chain until each UAV is 
properly positioned to ensure optimal connectivity. UAVs can hover at different altitudes 
to avoid collision. 
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(3) Airborne Mesh Network Scenario with Multiple UAVs 
Rather than building a straight-line relay that essentially connects two endpoints, 
we propose a more robust approach to a hastily formed mesh network - to take on an 
additional dimension. Using a large collection, or swarm, of multi-rotor UAVs (vice the 
traditional fixed-wing variety), a HFN may be formed over a physical space that covers 
wide areas of operations, blanketing the battlefield under an umbrella of network 
connectivity. Rather than being programmed to seek out end users and take up a position 
relative to them, the network nodes (and specifically the UAVs used to transport them) 
would use controlling software that enforces positioning relative to surrounding nodes. 
Minimum acceptable operational distances could be established as a means of ensuring 
redundancy (limiting separation of nodes increases overlap between nodes), and therefore 
maximize connectivity. Individual UAVs would not require a unique pilot for each one, 
and instead could rely on a centralized controlling unit. Using a simple graphical user 
interface (GUI), entire groups of UAVs could be controlled as a single unit, with 
formations being either user-defined or pre-programmed and switchable in real time. 
With UAVs maintaining constant positional data with respect to one another, as well as 
onboard GPS data, the entire network could be mobilized to cover either an area relative 
to the controlling unit (or other designated unit of interest), or to cover a specific 
geographic region. End users would be able to join their devices to the network 
regardless of which node they were in the vicinity of, and devices could intelligently 
select which node to connect to for most efficient delivery of data.  
UAVNet has some significant advantages compared to ground-based networks, as 
it is not restricted by environmental constraints due to terrain. Additionally, the inclusion 
of nodes that are not only self-healing with respect to network protocol management, but 
also self-guiding and self-propelled with respect to their physical orientation in the real 
world makes them ideal for near-autonomous network communication infrastructure. 
This provides the ability to extend the network over the horizon to cover a larger 
geographic area not typically achieved by ground based systems, while simultaneously 
limiting the number of personnel required to establish, operate, and maintain a network. 
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8. Lighthouse Technology 
Lighthouse is a suite of applications and a methodology developed by the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab. The 
CORE Lab itself is essentially an intelligence fusion center for NPS defense analysis 
students who help solve real-world problems they encountered in the field. The vast 
majority of these students come from the special operations community.  
The concept behind Lighthouse technology is to leverage open source, social 
network analysis, temporal records, geospatial data and relational analysis to create a 
common operational picture (COP) so military commanders can make informed decisions 
(Figure 34). Lighthouse is an effective tool in counter-improvised explosive device (C-
IED) operations as proven by its success in Iraq and Afghanistan. By structuring data 
already being collected and applying social network analysis, explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) units can rapidly and efficiently develop a broader understanding of the 
IED networks that they are trying to pursue. Better information leads to a better strategy 
of targeting and eliminating IED networks that wreak havoc on troops and the 
community at large. 
 
Figure 35.  Lighthouse Methodology (from NPS CORE Lab, 2014) 
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a. Lighthouse Analytical Components 
(1) Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
In a report by Katherine Zimmerman titled The Al Qaeda Network: A New 
Framework for Defining the Enemy, she describes the “leaderless worldwide jihad,” 
which is a shift in how terrorists, insurgents and various non-state actors organize 
worldwide. This new framework undercuts the idea of the importance of hierarchy and 
top-down directives. According to Zimmerman, “the concept of leaderless worldwide 
jihad minimizes the significance of the core leadership group and emphasizes 
decentralization and bottom-up operational initiative” (2012). The lack of centrality in 
this new terrorist framework makes it more difficult to defeat non-state armed groups, as 
simply targeting central individuals in the network, do not necessarily weaken their 
organization (Zimmerman, 2012). According to the same research, this new model makes 
insurgent organizations more resilient and less vulnerable, which presents a new 
conundrum for military planners.  
However, to solve this new dilemma, Sean Everton, a professor in the Defense 
Analysis Department at NPS, proposes the use of social network analysis (SNA) to 
understand the human terrain and the ties between insurgent actors to craft strategies to 
track, destabilize, and disrupt terrorist and insurgent networks. Everton’s book, 
Disrupting Dark Networks, is the first book in which counterinsurgency theory and social 
network analyses are coupled. Social network analysis, according to a research titled 
Targeting: Social Network Analysis in Counter-IED Operations, “is a type of applied art 
where social science and mathematics are integrated to flesh out the strategic options 
within both the kinetic and non-kinetic approaches of a counterinsurgency campaign” 
(Morganthaler and Summers, 2011, p. 10). And this remains true, particularly with the 
issues confronted by the RTARF in southern Thailand. It is as much a non-kinetic 
approach as it is kinetic. With the insurgents’ increased penetration and tight grip on the 
Malay-Muslim population, a more thorough understanding of the human terrain is 
required to devise strategic options that lead to a successful counterinsurgency operation.  
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SNA is accomplished using computer software such as NPS’ Lighthouse 
application that provides analysis of patterns and relationship structures, using powerful 
algorithms that allow RTARF military planners to fully understand the inner workings of 
insurgent networks (Wellman, 2008, p. 222).  
 
 
Figure 36.  Lighthouse Social Network Visualization (from NPS CORE Lab) 
One important aspect of modern SNA software is the ability to provide 
visualization of data collected mostly from human intelligence sources such as village 
surveys, interviews, informants and reconnaissance activities. The software generates a 
computer display (Figure 35) that can quantify the data and develop a clear operational 
picture that highlights the adversary’s key social and organizational relationships, 
network structure, and potential weaknesses as well as vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited for future operations. Additionally, the software can also identify changes in the 
social network as operations are executed so metrics can be tracked to determine if a 
selected strategy’s effectiveness. A constant reassessment of options based on evolving 
SNA data helps military commanders determine the appropriate course of action 
(McCormick, 2007, p.308). 
 68 
(2) Geospatial Analysis 
Geospatial analysis is defined by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
(NGA) as “the science of extracting meaning from geospatial data (information) and 
using geographic information systems (GIS) to uncover and investigate relationships and 
patterns to answer intelligence and military issues” (NGA, 2014). GIS is also defined by 
the NGA as “a computer-based, dynamic mapping system with spatial data-processing 
and querying capabilities” (NGA, 2014). GIS allows the problem solvers the data 
visualization of factors (Figure 36) affecting the problem to solve over the space. That 
visualization is given by mapping systematically the data to be analyzed. 
Using geospatial analysis, military commanders are able to measure risks, to 
establish patterns, and with accurate information and methods, they can, to some degree, 
predict future situations by establishing “what if scenarios” with the purpose of being 
more proactive. 
 
Figure 37.  Lighthouse GIS visualization (from NPS CORE Lab) 
Geospatial analysis and GIS play an important role in network centric operations. 
The integration of the geographic information about our own forces, the environment, 
and the enemy forces on the field is achieved by the implementation of a common GIS 
platform. Furthermore, the imagery collected by the sensors in the area of operations, and 
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the geospatial analysis deliver the required intelligence to provide an accurate “common 
picture” from the national down to the tactical level.  
(3) Temporal Analysis  
Temporal analysis is an important factor to consider in the GEOINT process as it 
provides an attempt to understand time patterns within collected data. This activity is 
often embedded in the geospatial analysis as time factor is a critical element into the 
whole analysis. It is difficult to talk about imagery, geospatial, and temporal analysis as 
separate entities, because they complement each other and are simply parts of the whole 
picture. In spite of the fact that an imagery product offers detailed information, when 
developing imagery analysis, it is still only a snapshot, a picture of a particular place at a 
particular time. Imagery is a static piece of intelligence, revealing something about where 
and when it was taken but nothing about what happened before and after. 
 
Figure 38.  Lighthouse Analytical Components 
b. Lighthouse Application 
(1) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations 
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At the heart of Lighthouse’s C-IED methodology is a component known as IED 
Network Analysis (IEDNA). This application leverages mobile hand-held devices that 
allow rapid, streamlined, structured on-scene data collection. IEDNA also allows EOD 
operators to display guides to ordnance, homemade explosives components, tactics, 
techniques and procedures as soon as they arrive at the scene of an IED explosion, to get 
a better situational awareness and provide reporting accuracy.  
To maximize the effectiveness of the Lighthouse application, the mobile devices 
require a network layer to transmit and receive data. During the Crimson Viper C-IED 
phase, the HFN wireless mesh was used to send data collected from the Hat Yao joint 
operations area to the IEDNA server at the NPS Core Lab in Monterey, California 
(Figure 38). 
 
Figure 39.  RTN EOD Personnel in Lighthouse C-IED Exercise  
Using field data collected from Thailand, the IEDNA server was able to narrow 
the geographic interest by using a combination of social, temporal and geospatial 
analysis. The ability to state explicitly an area that needs to be scrutinized allows 
commanders to focus units and resources more effectively and accurately as opposed to 
covering a wide swath of territory without any assurance of success.  
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Figure 40.  RTN EOD Collecting IED Data with Lighthouse Application 
The C-IED phase of Crimson Viper demonstrated to the RTARF the effectiveness 
of network centric approach that leveraged both hardware (HFN) and software 
(Lighthouse) in resolving one of the more pressing issues in southern Thailand – the IED 
problem. It is also important to note that the limited analysis conducted has been 
performed without the benefit of human intelligence which is the main source of the 
RTARF’s C-IED information.  
(2) Village Stability Operations  
Aside from C-IED operations, another component of a counterinsurgency 
campaign is village stability operations (VSO). Understanding the human terrain, requires 
a deep understanding of ethnic and tribal rivalries, local economy, influence of 
powerbrokers, and complex relationships within a village. The human domain is integral 
to population-centric conflicts such as the insurgency in southern Thailand and has a 
number of elements that extend beyond the physical environment. Understanding these 
elements is essential to VSO as it helps uncover the interconnected, socio-cultural 
network structure of local government officials, insurgents, other hostile elements, and 
other state and non-state actors. 
Lighthouse technology can help support the RTARF in VSO by providing its 
troops with a tool that provides the means to map the human terrain with sociograms that 
allows for socio-cultural analysis. Sociograms are maps that depict social ties between 
nodes as a network. Each node represents an individual actor or another entity such as a 
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village, tribe, or group affiliation. Nodes are positioned in a “social space” so that in a 
particular visual representation the closer they are together, the more social ties or 
characteristics they have in common. Understanding these social ties is key to 
conceptualizing complex village dynamics in a VSO environment. With superior 
information and a better understanding of the human terrain in southern Thailand, the 
RTARF can effectively direct its resources in key villages that have a significant 
influence to the insurgency movement. This supports information operations (IO) such as 
civil-military engagements and psychological operations. 
 
Figure 41.  Lighthouse Key Components 
(3) Rapid Information and Communication Technology Assessment  
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) assessments are critical for 
military first responders that deploy in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief (HA/DR) missions after a major natural or man-made disaster. In most cases, the 
ICT infrastructure is often degraded to the point that first responders are unable to 
effectively coordinate efforts and prioritize response. The ability to thoroughly assess the 
ICT landscape enables responding organizations to reduce the communications gap so as 
provide a coordinated, multi-agency response effort.  
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Although not necessarily a direct function of a counterinsurgency operation, it is 
important to note that HA/DR missions are crucial to winning “hearts and minds” in 
disaster situations that may potentially occur in the insurgent infested areas of southern 
Thailand. The RTARF’s ability to provide immediate and direct assistance to calamity 
victims will certainly provide a boost to government efforts in winning the population 
over.  
The NPS Lighthouse application that is installed on mobile devices such as a 
cellphone or tablet computer can serve as a primary data collection tool that helps 
overcome the constraints associated with the initial chaos in the disaster aftermath. 
Integrated with HFN technology, Lighthouse can provide access to real-time data as well 
as geospatial analytics that helps provide targeted allocation of resources that results in a 
reduction of gaps and less duplication of effort which ultimately prevents additional loss 
of life, spread of disease and unnecessary suffering.  
During the Crimson Viper technology demonstration, we conducted a three-day 
test of the Rapid Technology Assessment Team (RTAT) framework designed to conduct 
rapid ICT assessments. RTARF counterparts were trained on the use of the Lighthouse 
data collection/display tool at the joint operations area in Hat Yao, Thailand (Figure 41).  
 
Figure 42.  RTAT/ICT Training with RTARF Counterparts 
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Figure 43.  Lighthouse RTAT/ICT Screen Shot #1 
 
 
Figure 44.  Lighthouse RTAT/ICT Screen Shot #2 
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Figure 45.  Lighthouse RTAT/ICT Screen Shot #3 
 
 
Figure 46.  Lighthouse RTAT/ICT Screen Shot #4 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Thailand's southern insurgency is not a conventional war; it is an asymmetric 
conflict that ascribes mainly to Mao Zedong’s principles of popular protracted strategy. 
This approach leverages both the physical and human terrains found in rural 
environments. Despite this, the RTARF has employed a mainly conventional strategy that 
prevents it from acting swiftly, decisively, and appropriately against the insurgents.  
Countering asymmetrical threats as they relate to internal security requires the 
ability to perform various roles with high speed, small size, and reliable technology. 
These asymmetrical threats potentially challenge traditional command and control when 
applied to modern communication and sensor technology. Therefore, emerging 
technologies linked via wireless networks present increased capabilities for RTARF’s 
security forces deployed to remote areas of operation, and also help to facilitate shared 
situational awareness across the spectrum of combat. Additionally, non-state actors such 
as terrorists and insurgents have become more mobile, decentralized and sophisticated. 
Therefore, RTARF intelligence needs to transform its business processes and execute its 
intelligence activities in the most rapid and effective way possible, deviating from the 
traditional methods of relying solely on human intelligence (HUMINT) and a top-down 
staff approach to intelligence analysis. New capabilities that involve multi-source data 
collection, visualization methods and real-time information provide RTARF commanders 
with timely and accurate intelligence for supporting the final decision; this is a critical 
necessity to resolving the current insurgency situation in southern Thailand. 
A new technological framework that integrates the components and principles of 
network centric warfare enables the RTARF to be more flexible in a constantly changing 
insurgent environment. This would not only give them a strategic and informational 
advantage over enemy forces but it would also reduce their uncertainty, which would 
release their warfighters from the fog and friction of war.  
Network centric operations can be an expensive solution given the myriad of 
technologies that need to be implemented and integrated into current military operations. 
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The costs will largely depend on the level of complexity and technological sophistication 
that the RTARF wants to achieve. However, hastily formed networks (HFNs), in our 
opinion, meet the requirements in providing the RTARF with a cost-effective platform; 
the concept relies mainly on robust commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology that is 
relatively easy to deploy, operate and maintain.  
Integrating currently fielded HFN solutions into RTARF’s counter-insurgency 
operations would require little more than purchasing the known solutions and integrating 
them into existing infrastructure. UAV-mounted solutions that extend the range of 
communications are easily obtainable, although far less common—some amount of 
engineering would be required, but little more than fabricating mounting brackets for the 
correct fit and balance. 
Military-grade UAVs used by the U.S. are prohibitively expensive, with typical 
system costs for a Predator exceeding $3.7 million. Use of the Global Hawk is even 
more prohibitive, with cost exceeding $15 million per airframe. This makes sourcing 
UAVs from commercially available sources not only desirable but also necessary. 
Commercially available (or “professional” grade) solutions are globally available 
at a fraction of the cost of Predators or Global Hawks. Typical multi-rotor systems, 
capable of covering large distances and hovering for extended periods with large-capacity 
battery stores, cost under $10K for complete end-to-end solutions. GPS transponders, 
network equipment, and radios could be purchased and outfitted to these kinds of unit at 
reasonable cost. For a less robust but less costly system, “hobbyist” grade UAV solutions 
are available at the sub-$6K price range, with tracking and reporting hardware available 
for the price of a smartphone (which also include the advantage of considerably more 
well-supported software development environments). 
An added benefit to employing HFNs and their enabling technologies is that they 
reduce the manpower required to accomplish the same mission. This translates into a 
smaller personnel footprint and ultimately less exposure for police and military forces to 
be placed in harm’s way. Wireless mesh (WMN) and mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) 
provide the tactical networking framework for improved situational awareness and 
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information superiority through ubiquitous sharing of information including remote 
sensor and targeting data.  
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
For a more complex system of UAV-based network nodes, it is recommended that 
further research be conducted that identifies most viable solutions based on several 
characteristics: 
(1) UAV payload capacity 
(2) Battery energy density and weight 
(3) Lightweight solar paneling – for trickle charge and emergency recharge  
  while landed outside a controlled area 
(4) WiMax equipment (particularly comparing ranges vs. power consumption) 
It is also recommended that additional UAV research be conducted in pursuit of 
designing a system that approaches UAV control as a one-to-many system; specifically, a 
system that requires only one pilot controlling a swarm of UAVs that have semi-
autonomous capabilities. This concept, discussed in Chapter 4, would allow for 
considerable cost savings by reducing the number of personnel on station, and allow 
UAV onboard computer systems to react to network congestion, environmental, and 
adversarial related conditions faster than human response time would allow. 
Research into UAV swarm management software should initially focus on 
potential trade-offs between time on station (for a static-hovering node configuration) and 
mobility time/range (for a more fluid rotating-node based configuration). The 
development of swarm management software should be a multi-disciplinary project, and 
it is recommended that the following areas be researched prior to designing and coding 
the controlling software: 
Height-mapping algorithms using multiple sensor input (i.e., IR, high frequency 
audio echo, multiple offset image depth mapping, RADAR)— Altitude by altimeter will 
likely not be sufficient due to forest canopy environments; finding the most energy/cost 
efficient method of avoiding ground-based obstacles. 
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3-dimensional geographic positioning optimization algorithms based on GPS & 
relative signal strength of nearby nodes—the swarm should ideally share telemetry data 
from onboard sensors; developing the system in such a way that makes UAVs 
automatically reposition themselves based on other swarm member positions would 
significantly boost network fidelity and promote self-healing. 
Use of Vertlet integration for predictive positional adjustments—typically used 
for simulations of molecular interactions or structural stress testing, an existing method of 
Vertlet integration could be used to detect changes in the swarm positional data and 
develop real-time predictive models to adjust swarm vectoring and preserve positional 
integrity (i.e., high winds begin moving swarm members, and the predictive model would 
allow swarm members not yet effected to compensate in advance of the wind). 
It can be concluded that NPS’ participation in the Crimson Viper 2013 technology 
demonstration provided insight to HFN and emerging technologies which may help fulfill 
the RTARF’s requirement for a low- cost technological framework that helps address the 
existing information gap within its force structure that will ultimately lead to a successful 
counter-insurgency campaign in the Malay-Muslim regions of southern Thailand. 
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